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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOE S. VALDEZ, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
Respondent, 
Case No. 
10843 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, in December of 1966, in the Second Judi-
cial District, Weber County, was convicted of the crime of 
assault with a deadly weapon and of being an habitual 
criminal. The assault conviction was appealed to and af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Utah on September 29, 
1967. Stat.e v. Valdez, 19 (U.2d) 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967). On 
January 24, 1968, a petition for a writ of coram no'bis was 
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County. A hearing was held on the petition and the writ was 
denied. This is an appeal from that denial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Pursuant to the appellant's petition for a writ of coram 
nobis, a hearing was conducted in the District Court of Salt 
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Lake County. Testimony was presented as to 'the claimed 
existence of new evidence. On June 28, 1958, the petition for 
the writ of coram nobis was dismissed (R.16). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the lower court's dismissal 
of the appellant's petition for writ of coram nobis should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is in general agreement with the state· 
ment of facts as contained in the appellant's brie'f, so far as 
those portions representing the contentions of the appellant 
and the victim as to what transpired are concerned, which 
we·re taken directly from the transcript of the trial with an 
apparent minimum of coloring. While the appellant con· 
tends that no one in the bar saw the stabbing except Valerio 
himself, it was claimed during 'the coram nobis hearing that 
Miss Wilkerson had seen an indian make a poking motion 
at Valerio and later saw him put a knife in his pocket. The 
indian was apparently unavailable at both the trial and the 
subsequen!t hearing. When asked why she hadn't mentioned 
what she had seen during the trial, Miss Wilkerson 
indicated that the indian was a friend of the appellant and 
the appellant didn't want to get the indian in trouble. After 
the appellant's arrest and while he was in jail awaiting trial, 
the appellant claims that one Kelly Valdez, a distant cousin. 
along with Miss Shirley Wilkerson, visited Valerio at his 
home. Kelly Valdez contends that while at Valerio's home, 
Valerio told him he "wasn't sure who stabbed him." Kelly 
Valdez evidently didn't see fit to apprise the appellant of 
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this information until after his trial, conviction and im-
prisonment. This evidence was therefore claimed to be 
unknown and undiscoverable with due diligence at the time 
of trial. It was only on the occasion of a happenstance visit 
to the appellant by his distant cousin that the information 
was disclosed for the first time. The appellant now asserts 
that this same evidence given by Kelly Valdez at the coram 
nobis hearing directly contradicts the testimony of Valerio 
which remained unchanged at the hearing. It is argued that 
this new evidence along with the belated disclosure of what 
Miss Wilkerson now claims she actually saw during the 
assault, requires the granting of the writ of error coram 
no bis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO GR'ANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL ON A 
WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS. 
In order to substantiate the argument, the respondent 
will first show what the courts require in the way of 
prerequisites necessary to the issuance of a writ of coram 
nobis. Next, the respondent will show how the appellant 
has failed to qualify in nearly every aspects of these re-
quirements. Lastly, the attitude that appellate courts are 
required to assume in reviewing such appeals will be shown. 
A. Prerequisites necessary to issuance of writ. 
Courts of law have been a'typically unanimous in estab-
lishing the following prerequisites for the issuance of a 
writ of coram nobis: 
(1) Existence of material facts not presented at trial. 
The leading case upon which this jurisdic'tion has relied 
when determining questions as to the propriety of granting 
writs of coram nobis is that of People v. Shipman, 42 
Cal.Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993 (11965). The court in that case, whiie 
discussing the requirement for newly discovered facts, 
pretty much listed the entire gamut of requirements for 
issuance. They said: 
The writ of coram nobis is granted only when three 
requirements are met. (1) Petitioner must "show 
that some fact existed which without any fault or 
negligence on his part was not presented to the 
court at the trial on the merits and which if pre-
sented would have prevented the rendition of the 
judgment." (Cases cited.) ... (2) Petitioner must 
also show that the "newly discovered evidence [does 
not go] to· the merits of issues tried. Issues of fact 
once adjudicated even though incorrectly cannot be 
reopened except on motion for new tri'al." (Cases 
cited.) ... (3) Petitioner "must show that 'the facts 
on which he relies were not known to him and could 
not in the exercise of due diligence have 'been dis-
covered by him at any time substantially earlier 
than the time of bi's motion for the writ." (Cases 
cited.) ... 
It is easy to see why this case will be further cited in 
subsequent portions of this argument. 
In determining the degree of materiality needed in pre· 
senting facts not presented at the trial, it is interesting to 
note tihe case of People v. Vernon, 49 P. 326 (Cal 1935) in 
which the court stated : 
s 
It appears to be the law that in and of itself, con-
fession of guilt by one other than the applicant for 
writ of error coram nobis, will not furnish a suf-
ficient reason for the issuance of the writ. 
While this case may appear extreme in its requirement, 
courts in general are conspicuously restrictive in their de-
termination of what constitutes "materiality". The argu-
ments that follow will throw additional light on the 
requirement that newly discovered 'facts be material. 
(a) Defendant not to be at fault in non-presentation 
of facts. 
Not only must the newly discovered facts be material, 
but the fact that they were not presented at the time of trial 
must not result from any fault on the part of the defendant 
or his attorney. The Shipman case, supra, has already 
alluded to that requirement. This concept was earlier de-
clared in the Utah case of State v. Woodard, 108 U. 390, 
160 P.2d 432 (1945) where this court said: 
For a party to be entitled to this writ, it must 
appear th'at the failure to present the facts to the 
court was not due to any negligence or fault of the 
party seeking the writ. 
Even earlier than the Shipman case, California courts 
were insistent upon the defendant having "clean hands" in 
connection with newly discovered evidence. In People v. 
Tuthill, 198 P.2d 505, (Cal. 1948) the court held: 
The office of the writ of coram nobis is to bring the 
attention of the court to, and obtain relief from, 
errors of fact, such as a valid defense existing in the 
facts of the case, but which without negligence on 
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the part of the defendant was not made, either 
through duress or fraud or excusa:ble mistake. These 
facts, not appearing on the face of the record, and 
being such as known in season would have pre-
vented the rendition and entry of the judgment in 
question. 
Colorado courts require that the defendant be blameless 
in order to seek relief. 
The facts relied upon must be such as do not appear 
on the face of the record, failure to disclose which 
was attributable to no fault of petitioner and which 
would, if known, have forestalled the judgment. 
Hailey v. People, 115 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1945). 
Perhaps most applicable to the situation at bar is the 
holding of the Indiana court which suggests that relief will 
not lie where any misconduct in the presentation of the 
defendant's case has been evident. 
The writ of error coram nobis should not be granted 
to relieve one from a predicament in which he finds 
himself as the result of his own dishonest and 
fraudulent conduct. Vickery v. State, 106 N.E.2d 223 
(Ind. 1952). 
From the foregoing it 1s clear that every effort must 
have been made to obtain all available facts and evidence 
in presenting the defendant's case, and any hint of derelic· 
tion of duty either on the part of the defendant or his at· 
torney will be fatal in subsequent coram nobis proceedings. 
(b) Presentation of newly discovered facts would havr 
prevented judgment. 
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The greatest hurdle which the defendant must over-
come in qualifying for the writ of coram nobis is that of pre-
senting new facts, which in the minds of the reviewing 
court, would have conclusively precluded the contested 
judgment from having been rendered had such evidence 
been presented to the trier of facts. In the Woodard case, 
supra, the court applied what might be called the coram 
nobis "but for" test in saying: 
The writ of corarn nobis where available seeks to 
obtain a review of a judgment on the ground that 
certain mistakes of fact have occurred which were 
unknown to the court and to the parties affected 
and that but for such mistakes the judgment would 
not have been rendered. 
Again, the Shipman case, su:pra, holds that such newly 
discovered evidence must of necessity "have prevented 
rendition of judgment." 
The court in the Tuthill case, supra, similarly con-
cluded: 
... and where such [new facts] would have pre-
vented rendition of the judgment questioned. 
In the Hailey case, supra the Colorado court used 
the phrase " ... which would if known, have forestalled the 
judgment ... " It is also interesting to note the federal 
court's standard as to the necessary "weightiness" of the 
new evidence. In the case of U.S. v. W.est, 170 F. Supp. 200 
(N.D. Ohio 1959), a federal district court said: 
The function of coram nobis is to bring to the at-
tention of the court some fact unknown to the court 
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which if known would have resulted in a different 
judgment. 
The Sixth Circuit expressed the following in Dunn v. 
U.S., 238 F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1956): 
On application for writ of coram nobis the entire 
record will be looked into by the court and the 
judgment rendered which the whole requires. 
The court further stated in effec't that failure of a de-
fendant to make a showing that a retrial would have had a 
different result is grounds for denial of a motion in the 
nature of coram nobis to set aside his sen'tence. 
The Eighth Circuit in Bateman v. U.S., 277 F.2d 65 
(8th Cir. 1960) said: 
A writ of error coram nobis will not lie even if the 
alleged error be fundamental, unless it is probable 
that a different result would have occurred had the 
supposed error of fact been known to the trial court. 
Thus, little question should remain in the minds of 
reasonable men as to the quality and necessary effect of 
newly discovered evidence required to permit the issuance 
of the writ. This conclusive aspect is perhaps best summed 
up in this holding of a West Virginia Federal Court: 
The writ of error coram nobis does not lie for 
newly discovered evidence unless the newly 
discovered evidence is of such conclusive nature, 
that if known would have resulted in a different 
judgment. U.S. v. Ta.vlor, 49 F.Supp 353, (N.D. 
West Vir 1943) 
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(2) Newly discovered facts not to go to issues already 
tried. 
The second requirement called for in the Shipman de-
cision, supra, was as follows: 
(2) Showing the fact does not go to merits of 
issues tried. 
The court clarified this concept in saying in effect that 
issues of fact once adjudicated, even though incorrectly, 
cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial, even 
though alleged newly discovered evidence is not discovered 
until af'ter time for moving for new trial has elapsed or 
motion has been denied. 
In the Tuthill case, supra, the unanimity of California 
courts was displayed in this respect: 
It is a general rule that the writ will not be granted 
for newly discovered evidence going to the merits 
of the issues tried. Issues of fact once adjudicated, 
even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except 
on motion for new trial. 
It takes but little imagination to forsee the "parade of 
horribles" if every issue of the case, even though material, 
were open to relitigation. That ingredient of the law 
"finality", which all courts seek, would be reduced to noth-
ing more than a legal platitude. 
Again, California has been a leading state in guarding 
the finality of the judicial process. The California Supreme 
Court declared in Ex parte Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 
CJ18 (1947): 
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It is stated as a general rule that the writ of error 
coram nobis does not lie to correct an issue of fact 
which has been adjudicated even though wrongly 
determined, nor for alleged false testimony at the 
trial, nor on the ground that a juror swore falsely 
as to his qualifications, nor for newly discovered 
evidence." 
In a case in which the Supreme Court of the United 
States denied a writ of certiorari it was held: 
Generally, a writ of coram nobis will not be granted 
for newly discovered evidence going to merits of 
issues tried or to correct errors of law nor is it in-
tended to authorize any court to review and revise 
its opinion. People v. Coyle, 88 Ct.App.2d 967, 200 
P.2d 546 (1948). 
(3) Newly discovered facts were not known to de· 
fendant at the time of trial and were not discoverable in 
exercise of due diligence. 
As can be seen, this requirement is closely allied with 
the requirement that the defendant is not at fault. In Butt v. 
Graham, 6 U.Zd 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957) Justice Wade 
said in effect that ''where the record disclosed that no newly 
discovered evidence was produced at the hearing that could 
not have been produced at the trial in a camel knowledge 
prosecution, the trial court properly refused to grant coram 
no bis." 
Along with the court's decision in the Shipman case. 
supra, the court's decision in People v. Adamson, 210 P.2d 
13 (Cal. 1949) was also indicative of the consensus of opin· 
ion: 
-
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l ~ 
The applicant for the writ must show that the facts 
upon which he relies were not known to him and 
could not in the exercise of due diligence have been 
discovered by him at any time substantially earlier 
than the time c>f his motion for the writ. Otherwise, 
he has stated no ground for relief. 
In the case of People v. Campbell, 245 P.2d 311 (Cal. 
1952) the court succinctly stated the doctrine as follows: 
Petitioner for error coram nobis on ground of new-
ly discovered evidence did not entitle petitioner to 
relief from conviction when the alleged newly dis-
covered evidence was either known or should have 
been discovered by defendant at time of trial by 
use of reasonable diligence and when there was no 
allegation that petitioner had been prevented by 
extrinsic causes from offering same. 
Little more can be said than the requirements necessary 
for the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis are narrowly 
and precisely defined. Noncompliance with or nonfullfill-
ment of the least of these requirements is deemed fatal to 
an attempt at rehearing through the medium of coram nobis. 
B. Appellant failed to qualify for issuance of the writ. 
The respondent will now endeavor to show that the 
appellant has fallen substantially short of qualifying for the 
writ. 
(1) If newly discovered facts existed, they were either 
immaterial or of limited import. 
While it is true that the appellant's claimed new facts 
or evidence were no't presented at the trial, it is apparent 
that he places undue significance on them. In the first place, 
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the only new "facts" presented by the appellant is the fact 
that there exists a "distant" cousin who is willing to testify 
he heard the victim casually mention that he was uncertain 
as to who had stabbed him. The newly discovered "facts'' 
are neither that the victim said he wasn't sure nor that he 
in fact wasn't sure. In other words, the testimony of Kelly 
Va'ldez, the distant cousin, which was given at the hearing, 
must, o.f necessity, be classified as pure hearsay. As such, 
it can only be admitted to impeach the testimony of the 
victim, and 'in no way can be used in determining the truth· 
fulness of the matter asserted; i.e., that the victim, Mr. 
Valerio, didn't know who stabbed him. It is necessary 
before newly discovered facts can play a role in the granting 
of a writ of coram nobis that those facts be "true." As the 
Colorado court put it in Medberry v. People, 108 P.2d 243 
(Colo. 1940), "to justify the granting of a writ of error 
coram nobis, the substantive facts upon Which reliance is 
placed must be true." 
It is interesting to compare the claimed materiality of 
the cla:imed impeachment testimony in the instant case with 
the court ruled immateriality of a confession of guilt by 
other than the petitioner in the Vernon case, supra. It is 
difficult for the respondent to accord sufficient materiality 
to belated hearsay testimony o.f a friendly distant cousin 
to enti'tle appellant to a writ. 
In ascertaining the truthfulness of statements alleged 
to be newly discovered material evidence, the court is free 
to believe or disbelieve. In the case of Pe·ople v. Bob,eda, 
300 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1956) the court said: 
The trial courts determination of the truth or the 
veracity of a witness is final, and it is not required 
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to accept as true the testimony of a witness even 
though it is not contradicted. 
In the same opinion the court made a statement even 
more strikingly appropriate in the instant case, "It is not 
a remedy available to one who has been convicted on false 
testimony." Supra at P. 99 
The respondent contends that the evidence claimed to 
warrant the granting of a writ of coram nobis was immate-
rial and the court had every right, as it did, to find it so. 
(a) Defendant was at fault in not presenting facts at 
the trial which would have had equal or greater significance 
in providing for his defense than those alleged to have been 
newly discovered. 
After reading the record and the appellant's brief in 
this case, a number of questions remain not fully 'answered. 
For instance, why did Kelly Valdez wait so long to disclose 
such allegedly pertinent information to the appellant? Why 
wasn't this information at least conveyed to Miss Wilkerson 
who was present during the alleged utterance? What were 
the real reasons for evidence of the observed "poking 
motion" and knife not being disclosed at the time of trial? 
Who was the indian and where did he go? 
The above questions have one thing in common. They 
all tend to indicate either an overly imaginative mind or a 
person so unconcerned with his own defense and the out-
come of his own trial that he felt little compunction to pro-
vide his attorney with pertinent available information upon 
which to build a case. The informatfon, if true, concerning 
the indian and his knife, might have constituted some de-
fense and might have changed the outcome of the trial. It 
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is claimed that the reasons this information was not 
disclosed was that the appellant did not want to involve 
his indian friend and believed s u c h evidence was not 
necessary to his successful defense. The picture the appel 
lant paints of himself is strikingly similar with the image 
of the appellant in the case of Gross v. State, 40 N.E.Zd 333 
(Ind. 1942) where the court was compelled to hold: 
The writ will not is~me to one who has negligently 
failed to present the facts which if known to the 
judge would have prevented the judmen't. (Cases 
Cited.) Much less should it be granted to a de-
fendant who elects to perjure himself rather than 
use an honest defense. 
In the later companion case of Vickery v. State, 106 
N.E.2d 223 (Ind. 1952) the court finished the portrait of the 
appellant with these words: 
The writ of coram nobis should not be granted to 
relieve one from a predicament in which he finds 
himself as a result of his own dishonest and fraudu-
lent conduct. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the negligence 
which an appellant displays in defeating his petition for a 
writ of coram nobis need not be inexorably connected with 
the nondisclosure at the trial of the later discovered facts. 
If he seeks to perpetrate a fraud upon the court, whereby 
material evidence remains undisclosed, he has failed to 
fulfill the nonnegligence requirement. 
The California Supreme Court summed up this concept 
in In re De L:i Roi, 28 Cal.2d 264, 169 P.2d 363 (1946) the 
cour held in essence that: 
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Where a habeas corpus petitioner has trifled with 
the judicial process, schemed and conspired to de-
ceive the court and to impede or defeat justice in 
relation to a major crime, and he and his witnesses 
at the time of trial or on a referee's hearing of 
habeas compus petition or on a subsequent applica-
tion for such petition or in some or all of such pro-
ceedings, willfully presented false immaterial 
testimony, the writ of coram nobis even if otherwise 
proper, would be denied. (Emphasis added.) 
(b) There is no indication that the "new facts" would 
have had any effect on the prior judgment, let alone that 
such would have prevented the judgment. 
In having thoroughly discussed the strict standard 
which is universally applied to the needed effect of newly 
discovered evidence, and having pointed out the question-
ability of the new evidence presented by the appellant as 
to its competence and limited application, it is indeed dif-
ficult to imagine that a jury in hearing the "new evidence" 
would he compelled to find other than it did. In translating 
the accepted standard into the case at bar, the jury would 
have to have found the following in order that the writ 
should now issue: 
Because Kelly Valdez, a distant cousin and 
acquaintance of the accused, has testified that he 
heard the victim, Mr. Valerio, say "I'm not sure w'ho 
stabbed me," we find it impossible to find the 
accused guilty of the crime as charged. 
The respondent submits that once subjected to this 
test, which is the most significant when weighing the pro-
priety of issuing the writ, that the appellant's "newly 
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discovered evidence" is found lacking. It cannot be can. 
tended that such evidence would have precluded the judg. 
ment as rendered. 
(2) The issue as to who stabbed Valerio has already 
been tried. 
As previously mentioned, issues of fact once adjudi· 
cated, even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened, except 
on a motion for a new trial, even though alleged newly 
discovered evidence is not discovered until after time for 
moving for a new trial has elapsed. The trial court heard 
the issues as to appellant's guilt in the trial court. The jury 
decided those issues and found the appellant guilty. Those 
issues of guilt were again submitted to this court in the 
form of a criminal appeal. This court found sufficient 
evidence in the record to confirm the jury's decision as to 
those issues of guilt. A writ of coram nobis was sought with 
the claim of newly discovered eviden'ce. The evidence was 
heard, and yet the lower court continued to conclude, having 
the entire record before it, that the issue of the appellant's 
guilt had been conclusively decided. If ever an issue has 
been thoroughly heard and conclusively decided, the issue 
of appellant's guilt is such an issue. 
(3) New facts if in existence were discoverable before 
trial and could have been known by defendant. 
It is not inconceivable that had the appellant informed 
his attorney of what Miss Wilkerson later stated she saw. 
and if true what he personally must also have been aware 
o.f, that the attorney v.rould have had adequate opportunity 
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to confront the victim with this conflicting evidence and 
thereby have elicited from the victim that he did not recall 
for certain who had stabbed him. Not only is it possible 
that the new facts could have been discovered prior to the 
trial, but a reasonable probability exists that that is exactly 
what would have resulted had the appellant been duly dili-
gent in assisting counsel with his defense. 
C. Ruling of lower court will not be upset on appeal 
m the absence of abuse of discretion, and petitioner has 
burden of overcoming presumption in favor of validity of 
conviction. 
There has developed a well-founded legal tradition as 
to the proper roll to be assumed by courts in reviewing 
petitions for writs of error coram nobis. This roll, while 
similar to that assumed in the review of all appeals, is much 
more reflective of the principle that the lower court is in a 
substantially better position, to correctly ascertain and de-
cide issues of fact. Courts have expressed this concept in 
varying degrees. In People v. Fowler, 346 P.2d 792 (Cal. 
1959) the court said: 
T'he granting of relief in pro'ceedings of this kind 
rest largely within the lower court's discretion, and 
its ruling thereon will not be upset on appeal except 
for an abuse thereof. 
It further stated : 
The petitioner is deemed to be prima facie guilty. 
Defendant therefore has the burden of overcoming 
the presumption in favor of the validity of the 
judgment by establishing through a preponderance 
of strong and convincing evidence that he was de-
18 
prived of substantial legal rights by extrinsic 
causes. 
In People v. McNalley, 285 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1955) it was 
somewhat earlier stated in essence: 
On motion by the accused to annul, vacate and set 
aside the judgment, the burden was upon him to 
produce convincing proof of facts which would 
constitute a legal ground for setting aside the 
judgment, and on a motion by the accused to annul, 
vacate and set aside the judgment against him in a 
criminal case, there was a strong presumption that 
judgment was valid in all respects. 
With specific regard to new testimony presented by 
witnesses, the partial holding of the Bobeda case, cited 
earlier in this brief is reiterated. 
The trial court's determination of the truth or the 
veracity of a witness is final, and it is not required 
to accept as true the testimony of a witness even 
though not contradicted. 
Nor are state courts alone in this conception of finality, 
for the Sixth Circuit observed in their holding in Dunn v. 
U.S., supra, that: 
On application for a writ of coram nobis the entire 
record will be looked into by the court and the judg-
ment rendered which the whole requires. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the require· 
ments necessary for the issuance of the writ of error coram 
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nobis are well recognized by the courts, and that when the 
appellant's case is measured by those standards, it fails in 
nearly all aspects to qualify for the relief sought. It is sub-
mitted that the decision of the lower court in discharging 
the petition be affirmed in all respects. 
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